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ABSTRACT 
The Meal Bayesian agent reasons from a global probability model. Real agents must 
use simplified models which they know to be adequate only in restricted circumstances. 
Very little formal theory has been developed to help fallibly rational agents manage the 
process of constructing and revising small world models. The goal of this paper is to 
present a theoretical framework for analyzing model management approaches and to 
illustrate the approach by analyzing aparticular class of model management strategies. 
For a probability forecasting problem, a search process over small-world models is 
analyzed as an approximation toa larger-world model which the agent cannot explicitly 
enumerate or compute. Conditions are given under which the sequence of small-world 
forecasts converges to those produced by the larger-world model 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper  is concerned with the use of decision theory as a f ramework 
for analyzing the behavior of an intel l igent autonomous agent. It is 
general ly agreed that our best exemplars of intel l igent autonomous agency 
- -human be ings - -do  not behave as decision theorists. It is also widely 
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accepted that many systematic departures from the Bayesian orm can be 
explained as heuristics which people use to cope with computational 
constraints. Given that any agent we can build will have limited computa- 
tional capacity, what role should decision theory play for the enterprise of 
developing intelligent autonomous agents? 
Bayesian decision theory justifies many qualitative features of generally 
accepted "good" reasoning and explains many qualitative features of 
"bad" reasoning (see, e.g., [1-2]). The theory is often successfully applied 
in cases in which the idealized axioms are clearly unrealistic. But this 
success often depends on the intervention of a highly trained (human) 
decision analyst who works with the decision maker to construct a model 
of the problem. Similarly, decision-theoretic computer systems either are 
hand-crafted for constrained, well-understood domains (e.g.,[3]), or use 
heuristic methods at the meta level to construct an object-level decision- 
theoretic model (e.g., [4-6]). 
In the latter approach, known as knowledge-based model construction, a 
heuristic meta-level reasoner uses a problem description to construct a 
problem-specific decision theoretic model over a restricted set of proposi- 
tions and actions. Such models have been termed small-world models 
[7-8]. Decision theory enforces consistency on beliefs and action recom- 
mendations produced by the small-world models. The meta level reasoner 
may use the output of a small-world model, modify it, or change the model, 
depending on the situation. Knowledge-based model construction allows 
for more flexible systems that address a more general range of problems of 
potentially greater complexity [9]. But two important questions need to be 
addressed with respect o the role of decision theory in knowledge-based 
model construction systems. First, if formal justifications of decision theory 
assume "grand-world" coherence, what justifies decision theory on the 
small world? Second, what theory underlies the metareasoner? 
One response to these questions is to rest justification of a model 
construction system on coherence of the knowledge base and soundness of 
the model construction procedure. That is, one requires the underlying 
knowledge base to be consistent with an implicit coherent model of the 
domain, and the construction procedure to produce outputs that are 
entailed by the implicit domain model. The requirement of soundness may 
be relaxed to require that outputs approximate results entailed by the 
domain model. (Note that if only approximation is required, problem- 
specific models need not be explicitly decision-theoretic). A topic of recent 
research interest is the development of representation languages with 
greater than propositional expressive power [6; 10-12]. Such languages can 
be used to construct knowledge bases that implicitly encode a complex set 
of probabilistic relationships among domain entities. Breese [6] has devel- 
oped a proof of soundness of a model construction procedure under the 
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assumption that the knowledge base is consistent with an underlying 
coherent domain model. However, ensuring the consistency of a complex 
knowledge base remains problematic. 
Thus, in one view of the role of decision theory, a model construction 
system is justified according to how well it approximates an implicit 
coherent domain model. But a defining feature of intelligence is not 
necessarily the ability to produce good solutions ab initio, but the ability to 
learn from past experience to produce progressively better solutions. 
Bayesian inference is a powerful earning theory with great potential for 
application to the development of learning systems. There is well- 
developed theory in the statistical community regarding the ability of 
Bayesian inference models to produce accurate outputs with the proper 
environmental feedback (e.g., [13-14]). The AI community has applied this 
theory to learning graphical probability models (e.g., [15-16]). The focus 
has been on learning the structure and parameters of template models 
(static models which apply to a large class of problem instances) from a 
sample of instances. The field has not yet addressed the issue of using 
environmental feedback to revise an implicit domain model encoded in a 
language with first-order expressive power. 
Another view of the role of decision theory, then, is to evaluate the 
behavior of a system as it adapts with feedback from the environment. A 
system can be viewed as consisting of a knowledge base, a procedure for 
producing solutions given inputs defining a problem to be solved, and a 
facility for modifying the knowledge base and/or the procedure for 
constructing solutions in response to feedback from the environment. 
Decision-theoretic justification of such a system applies to the behavior of 
the system over time as it adapts to environmental feedback. Specific 
questions of interest include whether the system's problem-solving ability 
improves over time and how fast this improvement occurs. 
This paper presents an approach to analyzing the convergence behavior 
of learning systems. The basic formulation can be summarized as follows. 
The metareasoner controls a search process over a space of small-world 
models. As used in this paper, a model could refer to a problem structure 
together with a parameter estimation method, to a knowledge base to- 
gether with a problem-specific model construction procedure, or even to a 
knowledge-based construction system together with a learning procedure. 
The search process is viewed as an approximation to a (computationally 
infeasible) decision-theoretic model on a larger world. It is assumed that 
the agent would prefer the larger-world model, if it could be computed, to 
the feasible small-world approximation. Within this formal framework, 
search processes over small worlds can be analyzed to determine how well 
they perform as approximations to the larger-world model. Note that the 
larger-world model does not necessarily represent he agent's "true" 
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grand-world beliefs. Many authors have considered the assumption of 
grand-world beliefs to be problematic (e.g., [8]; see also [14]). It is not 
necessary to assume that the agent has true grand-world beliefs; all that is 
required is that the agent prefers the larger world model to the feasible 
small-world approximation. The goal of this paper is to analyze conditions 
under which search over small-world models converges to larger-world 
beliefs. No claim is made to optimality of the search processes considered; 
analysis of computational efficiency and convergence rates is left for future 
research. 
In this paper, attention is restricted to the common and important class 
of problems in which an agent forecasts probabilities of a sequence of 
events. These events may be repeated events of the same kind, as when an 
agent assesses probabilities for different diseases given patients' observed 
symptoms. Alternatively, the events may be of different kinds, as when a 
common-sense r asoner makes predictions about events it expects given its 
current situation. In either case, it is assumed that the agent receives 
feedback about whether the forecast events actually occur. The agent can 
search a large space of probability models, but has access to only two 
models (the current model and a comparison model) at any given time. 
Under given conditions on the agent's earch process, results are derived 
about convergence of the agent's model to the larger-world probabilities. 
The conditions on the search process and the process producing the 
observations are quite general. In particular, virtually all the AI literature 
on learning probability models assumes that observations are a random 
sample from a template model. The main results of this paper do not 
require a random sample, nor do they make any stationarity assumptions 
regarding the process producing the observations. There is also no require- 
ment that the models available to the agent be decision-theoretic. Of 
course, if the process is so complex that no model available to the agent 
can approximate it no matter how much feedback is available, then it is 
unreasonable to expect the agent to be able to converge to accurate 
forecasts. Therefore, an assumption is required that the set of available 
models is adequate for predicting the phenomenon (a formal definition of 
adequacy is given below). 
Other authors have considered the problem of searching over a large 
space of models (e.g., [15-17]). Although these authors consider the 
problem of batch learning whereas the present paper deals with incremen- 
tal learning, the approaches are consistent. This paper does not explicitly 
consider the problem of selecting an action based on probability forecasts. 
Horvitz [18] and Russell and Wefald [19] take a decision-theoretic ap- 
proach to the problem of taking action under resource constraints. Watkins 
and Dayan [20] consider the problem of taking action while learning a 
world model. 
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2. THE SEQUENTIAL FORECASTING PROBLEM 
2.1 General Definitions 
Consider an agent whose goal is to predict he outcomes of a sequence 
of observations occurring sequentially in time. The phenomena to be 
predicted may be defined in advance or defined ynamically on the basis of 
information observed as the sequence progresses. The agent's prediction 
may take into account any information available to the agent up to the 
time of the forecast. It is assumed that forecasts are made with feedback 
from previous trials. Initially it is assumed that the agent does not forget 
any information she has learned. Section 3 below considers the extent o 
which results carry over when this assumption is relaxed. The agent makes 
predictions in the form of a probability distribution over the possible 
outcomes of each trial. 
Formally, let X t (t = 1, 2 . . . .  ) be a random variable representing the 
observation the agent is attempting to predict. Let Y, be a random 
variable representing auxiliary information the agent has observed after 
predicting X t_ 1 but before predicting X,. Then the agent's prediction of 
X, is based on prior information H, = (Y1, XI, Y2, )(2 . . . . .  Yt)" The 
variables X, and Y, may be numerical or qualitative, discrete or continu- 
ous, unidimensional or multidimensional. At each time period the agent 
forecasts a probability distribution for the random variable X,. This 
distribution may depend on the entire history H, observed up to the time 
the prediction is made. 
It is not necessary that the forecast distribution Pt represents he agent's 
conditional probability distribution for X, given H,. In fact, one need not 
assume that the agent has a "true" probability distribution for the X r This 
paper examines the situation in which the agent periodically revises her 
method of producing forecasts based on the judgment that such revision 
will improve subsequent forecasts. The paper examines the long-run be- 
havior of forecasts p, when the agent uses such a model revision process. 
Assumptions are given under which forecasts can be shows to converge in 
the long run to the agent's larger-world probabilities. 
2.2 Models and Mixture Distributions 
The agent produces forecasts using a model. A model is a recipe for 
computing Pt as a function of H t. There exists a large body of statistical 
theory to analyze the behavior of forecasts Pt assuming that the model for 
producing forecasts is correct and given other assumptions about the 
parameter estimation method. A growing body of research on model 
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uncertainty (e.g., [21-22]) considers the situation in which the correct 
model is unknown, but is assumed to be one of a specified family of 
models. The approach taken in the present paper is consistent with this 
literature. 
The concept of a model is quite general. Examples of models include: a 
Bayesian etwork over the variables (X, Y); a neural network for predict- 
ing X t given Yt; a knowledge base of rules for predicting Xt from Yt; or a 
knowledge-based model construction system that uses information from H t 
to construct a model that predicts X t. It is assumed that a large class of 
models is available for producing forecasts. The agent may use only one of 
the models to produce any given forecast Pt. Although she uses it to 
produce forecasts, the agent does not necessarily regard her current model 
as correct. While producing forecasts, she also searches the space of 
models, replacing her current model with a new one if the new model 
appears to be better. 
Let each model have an associated index to, which is assumed to belong 
to the set 1~. Each model represents a recipe for computing probability 
forecasts Po.,(XtlHt) at each time period from information known to the 
agent prior to that time. Formally, for each kit and each model to, viewed 
as a function of X t P,o(XtIH t) is a generalized probability density function 
[23] with respect o some measure common to all the models. This means 
that P,,,(.IH t) is a probability mass function if X t is discrete and a 
probability density function if X t is continuous. More complex cases, such 
as mixtures of discrete and continuous distributions, or distributions on 
fractal sets, are also possible. In addition to forecasts for X t, models may 
also specify a generalized probability density function P,o(YtIHt_1, Xt_ t) 
for Yr. 
Models may contain unknown parameters which are estimated from 
data. As a simple example, P,o may assume the X t are independent with a 
common but unknown probability distribution 7r t -~r .  The model Po, 
would also specify a method for estimating the unknown probability 
distribution ~r from the data. In a more complex model the probability of 
X~ might depend on a set of indicators (Za~ . . . . .  Zr)  = Z(Ht )  observable 
prior to time t. Again, the unknown probabilities ~t = ~r(Zlt . . . .  , Zrt) 
would be estimated by the model from the data. An explicitly Bayesian 
model would begin with a prior distribution for ~t and set Pt equal to the 
posterior expectation of ~t given H t. However, models need not be 
Bayesian. P,o can be any recipe for computing a probability distribution for 
X t given information in H~. For example, a neural network might be used 
to compute Pt from the Zit, and a neural-network training algorithm might 
be used to estimate the unknown weights. 
For this paper, it is assumed that the set ~ is finite, although some of 
the results extend to the case where f~ is countably infinite. The finiteness 
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assumption is not as restrictive as it may seem. As already noted, each 
model may have an associated set of unknown parameters which may have 
uncountably many possible values. The index ~o should be thought of as 
denoting model structure (e.g., the pattern of connectivity in a neural 
network or the graphical structure of a Bayesian etwork relating observ- 
able variables). Parameters specific to each model structure (e.g., neural 
network variables; conditional probability matrices for a Bayesian etwork) 
may be estimated as functions of the observed history. 
The set ~ might represent either a space of implicitly defined models 
which a single agent can enumerate, or a population of agents each of 
whom has a recipe for predicting X t. This paper considers the probability 
forecasts of a single agent who has access to the models in ~, either 
because she is the agent enumerating and computing the implicitly defined 
models, or because she can ask the other agents in the population for their 
forecasts. However, the agent is assumed to have finite resources for 
computing or communicating. It is assumed that only one model can be 
used to produce a given forecast Pr 
The set ~ comprises all the models the agent is able to consider. It is 
assumed that the agent believes f~ to be adequate in that the agent's 
larger-world model is a probability mixture over the P~ (this assumption is 
common to the literature on model uncertainty). An agent would assign a 
probability mixture over the Po~ if she believed one of the models to be 
correct and expressed her uncertainty about which one was correct as a 
probability distribution over f~. Note, however, that an agent might be 
willing to assign a mixture distribution over ~ without believing in the 
literal truth of any of the models. For example, the agent might be willing 
to assign the mixture distribution if she believed that none of the models 
was correct, but that at least one of the models closely approximated the 
correct distribution. Finite mixture distributions may often be good ap- 
proximations to more complex distributions (cf. [24]). 
It is assumed that the full mixture distribution is too complex for the 
agent o compute. Nevertheless, he considers ~ to be a reasonable and 
plausible set of models to consider. In particular, she believes that if she 
could compute the mixture distribution, she would be satisfied with the 
forecasts it produces. This paper derives results about the agent's actual 
forecasts (under a particular type of policy for enumerating and evaluating 
models) under the assumption that the observations are being produced 
according to the mixture distribution. It is therefore also assumed that the 
agent is willing to accept such asymptotic analyses as applying to her 
forecasts. Both these assumptions--that the mixture distribution produces 
good forecasts and that asymptotic analyses under the mixture distribution 
are relevant--may pply to an agent who would not be willing to accept an 
assumption that the mixture distribution represented her "true" beliefs. 
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Let the agent's prior probability for the model o) be denoted by o~o, 1
where Eao,1 = 1 and all ao~  are assumed to be strictly positive. Define 
o~,otP, o(x, lI4,)P,o(Y,+ l IH,,Xt) 
(1) 
a~,,+l = E~, o~,o,,P,o,(X, IHt)Po,,(Y,+IlHt,X,)" 
The quantity (1) is the agent's posterior probability for model o) given 
H~+ a- The posterior probability is computed using all information available 
to the agent, including both the forecast variable X t and the auxiliary 
variable Yt+ 1. If Yt+I has the same distribution under all models o9, then 
(1) becomes 
(2) o~.,,,+ i = E,o' ~ , ,P~, (x ,  II-1,) 
which does not depend on Yt+ 1. If the model w does not produce forecasts 
for Yt+m the agent uses (2) to compute the posterior probability. This is 
mathematically equivalent to assuming that the Yt have the same distribu- 
tion under all models. To simplify exposition, it is convenient to use a 
single expression for the posterior probability of the model to. In cases 
where the models produce forecasts for both X t and Yt (or some elements 
of the random vector Yt), Xt may be redefined to include all those 
quantities for which the models produce forecasts. Y~ is then defined as a 
set of auxiliary variables for which no forecasts are produced. (Note the 
implicit assumption that all models forecast he same variables.) With this 
redefinition, the expression (2) gives the posterior probability of the model 
oJ. It is understood that under this formulation some elements of X t may 
be of direct interest to the agent, while others may be of interest only 
because they are used to update the probabilities of the different models. 
The agent's probability for event X t given the available prior informa- 
tion is equal to 
P(Xt lH  t) = Y'~ a,,,tPo,(Xt[Ht). (3) 
tO 
Adopt for the moment he position of an agent who believes that one of 
the models is correct, although she does not know which one. Call this 
unknown correct model Po,*. The following lemma and corollary show that 
the agent believes that the mixture distribution converges as the number 
of observations grows large to probabilities that agree with the unknown 
correct model P,o*. 
LEMMA 1 With probability 1 under the distribution Po~*, the posterior 
probability a,, t o f  the model to converges to a limiting value o~,o as t ~ ~. 
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I f  the limiting posterior probability is greater than zero, then as t --> oo 
P~(X, IH,) 
P,o,(X, IH,) 
(4) 
with probability 1 under Po,*. 
Lemma 1 states that (4) is satisfied with probability 1 (assuming that the 
observations arise from the distribution Po,*) for all models except those 
whose posterior probability tends to zero as the number of observations 
increases. In other words, the agent believes that the only models that can 
have nonzero limiting posterior probabilities are those that agree in the 
limit with the correct model oJ*. 
COROLLARY 2 With probability 1 under P~., 
P(Xt lH ~) - Po~.(XtIH ,) -~ 0 as t ~ ~. (5) 
Corollary 2 states that if the data are produced by some unknown "true" 
probability distribution, then Bayesian updating of a mixture distribution 
which assigns nonzero probability to the correct model will eventually 
result in forecasts agreeing with the true probabilities. 
Lemmas 1 and 2 depend on the assumption stated earlier that all 
models have nonzero prior probabilities. If no model for which (4) holds 
has nonzero prior probability, then posterior probabilities of models may 
never converge to limiting values. On the other hand, these results 
remain valid if the correct model ~o* is not itself in [l, but at least one 
model to for which (4) holds is in fl. In fact, all the results in this paper 
can be shown to carry through when w* is not in ~, but there is a 
model in ~ which satisfies (4). 
Proofs of results are given in the Appendix. The proofs of Lemma 1 
and Corollary 2 carry through for countable [l as well as for finite 1~. 
3. MODEL SEARCH AND REVISION 
3.1. Search and Revision--No Forgetting 
Suppose that (3) describes the agent's beliefs about the X r In other 
words, the agent's beliefs can be represented as a mixture over the models 
Po,. However, the agent cannot compute the full mixture distribution, and 
thus she does not "know" her larger-world beliefs at any point in time. 
This section defines and analyzes a heuristic model search and revision 
process, referred to as SR. The SR process makes no claim to optimality, 
nor is it intended as a faithful psychological ccount of how people reason. 
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It is constructed as a simple procedure which captures important qualita- 
tive features of human reasoning, such as belief persistence (adherence to 
one's current hypotheses despite disconfirming evidence) and sudden 
"paradigm shifts" (which occur when the search process visits a model very 
different from but better than the current one). 
Informally, the SR process can be described as follows. At each time 
period, the agent makes a prediction given her current model (one of the 
P,o), and at the same time (i.e., based on the same information) selects an 
alternate model according to a model search procedure. After observing 
Xt, she compares the relative posterior probabilities of the current and 
alternate models. If the posterior probability of her current model is 
higher than that of the alternate model, she retains the current model; 
otherwise, she replaces it with the alternate model. 
Formally, let toct and toat denote the current and alternate models at 
time period t. Each period's alternate model is selected according to a 
model search distribution /zt(to) defined as follows. The model search 
distribution /zt(to) is a real-valued function such that /zt(to) > 0 for all 
to ~ l) and E/zt(to)= 1. The search distribution may depend on the 
agent's prior information: /zt(to)=/x(tolHt). For each t > 0, toat is as- 
sumed to be selected independently of X~ according to the probability 
distribution P[ COat = to ln t ]  = /z t ( to ) -  If the past period's current and alter- 
nate models toe.t-1 and toa,t-1 are assumed to be part of the current 
period's available information Yt, then the model search distribution may 
depend on the previous earch path. This allows the agent to use model 
search heuristics which involve incremental changes to a model (e.g., 
adding or subtracting a link in a Bayesian etwork). The only restriction on 
the search process is that each model is visited infinitely often--that is, the 
number of times a model is visited tends to infinity as the number of trials 
becomes infinite. 
The current model is initialized arbitrarily to tocl and updated as 
follows. After each time period, the agent retains the current model if its 
posterior probability is higher than that of the alternate model, and 
replaces it with the alternate model otherwise. That is, the agent selects 
her current model at time t according to 
= [ O)c,t- 1 if a~,c,,t > a~o,, t , 
toot [ toa,t-- I o therw ise .  
(6) 
According to (6), the choice of whether to stay with the current model or 
switch to the alternate model requires comparing the posterior probabili- 
ties of the current and alternate models. The expression (3) for computing 
posterior probabilities of models involves a normalizing factor obtained by 
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summing over all models. Fortunately, the normalizing factor cancels out 
of the inequality in (6). If )to, ' = 1 and 
)to,,t+l = )ttotPo,(gtlnt ), (7 )  
then ao,, in (6) can be replaced by a,olho, t. Nevertheless, to compute (6) 
the agent does need to compute the likelihood under each newly enumer- 
ated model of the entire past sequence of data (the reasonableness of this 
assumption is discussed in greater detail below). 
The following results compare the asymptotic behavior or SR with that 
of the mixture distribution. For Theorem 3, again assume that the agent 
believes one of the models, denoted by Po,,, is correct. 
Suppose that wa~ visits each w ~ [l infinitely often. Then THEOREM 3 
under P~,, 
Po, ( X, lU,) 
Po,,(x,I/L) ,1  (8) 
with probability 1 as t ---, oo. 
Corollary 4 drops the reference to an unknown correct distribution. 
COROLtARY 4 Under the mixture distribution, the probability that 
IPO,,(X, IH,) - P (X ,  IH,)I > E (9) 
converges to zero for each • > O. 
Corollary 4 states that under the mixture distribution, the difference 
between the forecast of oct and the forecast of the mixture distribution 
converges in probability to zero. Convergence in probability is a weaker 
form of convergence than probability-1 convergence, the form of conver- 
gence implied in the earlier results. According to Theorem 4, it is not 
certain that the current model's probability converges to the mixture 
model's probability. However, the probability that the difference (9) ex- 
ceeds any fixed nonzero constant becomes arbitrarily small as t approaches 
infinity. In other words, with more observations it becomes increasingly 
probable that the current model's forecast will be very close to the mixture 
model's forecast. 
3.2. The Model Search Distribution 
As noted above, the SR process claims neither optimality nor strict 
psychological realism. Although simplified, it is nevertheless intended to 
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capture key aspects of human scientific reasoning. Consider, for example, 
how SR with a suitably designed model search distribution might produce 
a model search trajectory characterized by belief persistence in the face of 
disconfirming evidence, followed by sudden paradigm shifts when a better 
model is enumerated. 
Suppose that a model proximity measure has been defined such that the 
distributions Po~ and P~,, are similar when the model to is near the model 
to'. Suppose also that the model search distribution places high probability 
on toat near the current model toct. This corresponds to the heuristic 
judgment hat models similar to the current best model are likely to 
perform better than alternate models chosen at random. Under such a 
search distribution, most modifications to the agent's current model are 
likely to be relatively minor. If the current model is not correct, occasional 
anomalies can be expected. That is, events an incorrect heory considers 
improbable might be expected to occur more often than the theory 
predicts. Eventually, a distant model may be generated that has higher 
posterior probability than the current model. This will be the case if the 
new model explains anomalies in the current model, approximates the 
current model on the things the current model predicts well, and does not 
have too low a prior probability relative to the current model. (Note that 
ad hoc hypotheses constructed specifically to fit anomalies may fail to be 
accepted if they have extremely low prior probabilities. If accepted, they 
will soon be dropped if their predictions fail to hold up over time.) When a 
better model is found, SR replaces toct with the new model toat, and a 
paradigm shift occurs. The search process now begins searching for models 
near the new model. If the best model in that new neighborhood was not 
enumerated initially, there then ensues a period in which the new model is 
incrementally refined by searching its neighborhood for improved models. 
Thus, SR with an appropriately defined model search process can produce 
behavior which mimics qualitatively the process of scientific inference put 
forward by Thomas Kuhn [25]. 1 According to Kuhn, periods of "normal 
science," characterized by incremental improvement of existing theories, 
are interrupted by occasional "paradigm shifts," or sudden qualitative 
changes in the dominant heory. 
1The term paradigm shift is usually reserved for major belief shifts, typified by the replace- 
ment of Newton's theory by the theory of relativity. The formal framework presented here 
applies whether to indexes grand theories of the universe or simple time-series models of 
stock-market prices. Although one might balk at using the term paradigm shift in the latter 
context, it is interesting to note that the same formal framework applies to belief changes at a 
variety of levels. 
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Applications of Bayesian model search have focused on graphical proba- 
bility models [15-17] such as Bayesian networks and Markov fields. A 
standard local model modification heuristic in such searches i  the addition 
or removal of an edge in the model graph, together with a corresponding 
redefinition of the local probability model associated with variables in the 
neighborhood of the added or subtracted edge. Empirical results from this 
type of model search appear promising (e.g., [16-17]). Herskovits [26] gives 
a proof of convergence for a particular local search procedure for learning 
Bayesian etworks from a random sample of observations. 
The SR procedure as defined above always selects the most probable of 
the current and alternate models. Recent research (e.g., [17, 27]) suggests 
that stochastic search may result in more mobile searches, and therefore 
may reduce the likelihood that the search process becomes tuck for a long 
time in local maxima. Madigan and York [17] consider the problem of 
model search with a fixed data set. They construct a stochastic procedure 
for deciding whether to replace toat with %t and show that their model 
search procedure yields a Markov chain in which the equilibrium probabil- 
ity of being in state to is equal to the posterior probability of state to. For 
large data sets, then, the stationary probability of being in a state to for 
which (4) is satisfied would become large. 
The results of Section 3.1 depend on the assumption that the acceptance 
policy deterministically selects the model with the highest posterior proba- 
bility. These results do not apply to a stochastic acceptance policy, al- 
though it may be possible to develop convergence theory for incremental 
search with a model acceptance policy similar to that proposed by Madigan 
and York. However, the above results do apply if an appropriately defined 
stochastic model acceptance policy is modified so that predictions are 
made using the most probable model enumerated so far. 
To explore this idea, consider the following stochastic model search 
policy. First, restrict the model enumeration distribution so that the 
probability of enumerating model to depends on the past history only 
through the current model %,. That is, tzt(to) = /~(~o] to~t). For example, in 
a graphical model, /z(tolto~t) might place positive probabilities on models 
differing from ~o~t by a single edge. Next, define a model acceptance policy 
as follows. The new model %.t ÷1 is set equal to ~%t with probability ~t. 1 
and remains equal to to~t with probability 1 - ~, ÷ 1. The model acceptance 
probability ~t÷l is constructed so that model search with a fixed data set 
results in a Markov chain in which the stationary probability of being in 
state to is equal to the posterior probability of the model to. For this 
construction, a few assumptions are required. First, it is assumed that no 
X t has zero probability. Second, it is assumed that if ~z(to]~o') is nonzero 
then so is /~(~o'l oJ). This assumption ensures that transition back and forth 
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between any two models is always possible. The model acceptance proba- 
bility is then defined as 
1 if ],Z( OAatlO.)ct)Olct < [,Z( O)ct[O.)at)Olat , 
~t+l = ~(COc'lOJ~t)a~/ if i.t(tOat]tOct)Otct ~ id,(tOctltOat)Otat " (10) 
/.~( O.)atl (-Oct) Olct 
Under this distribution, the probability of switching from the current to 
the alternate model increases as the posterior probability of the alternate 
model increases relative to the posterior probability of the current model. 
The probability of switching to the alternate model also increases as 
I.Z(tOct [ O)at ) increases relative to ],Z(Wat[O.)ct). That is, the stochastic model 
search process is more willing to switch to a new model toat if there is a 
higher chance of enumerating the model O)ct again (and hence of getting 
back to toot if it has a high posterior probability). Thus, the model search 
process favors both high-probability models and revocable decisions. As 
before, (10) depends only on the ratio of act to aat, and therefore the 
normalizing constant need not be computed. 
As noted above, it may be desirable to combine a mobile search based 
on a stochastic acceptance policy with the guarantee from (6) that predic- 
tions are made using the most probable model enumerated so far. To do 
this, assume that the agent keeps three models active at any given time: a 
prediction model tom, a current search model ooct, and an alternate model 
Oat. The alternate model toat is enumerated according to the distribution 
/z(.Iwc,t_l). The current search model t%t is replaced by the alternate 
model tOat according to the stochastic policy with replacement probabilities 
defined by (10). The prediction model topt is retained if it is better (has 
higher posterior probability) than both to~, and oJct; otherwise it is re- 
placed by the better of toot and t%t. The role of t%t is to increase mobility 
of the model enumeration process by allowing the model on which the 
search distribution is conditioned to wander stochastically, rather than 
remaining fixed at the model being used for predictions. The bias built into 
(10) keeps the search focused on relatively probable models. 
Theorems 3 and 4 would apply to predictions made by to m if the 
stochastic search distribution visited each model infinitely often. However, 
because of the way the search distribution (10) was constructed, one would 
expect models whose probabilities converge to zero to be visited less and 
less often as more observations are obtained, and thus some models may 
not be visited infinitely often. It is fairly simple to modify (10) to ensure 
that all models are enumerated infinitely often. This may be achieved by 
modifying the acceptance rule to obtain a different fixed-sample-size 
stationary distribution. A good candidate would be a distribution ear the 
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current posterior distribution over models, but constrained so that the 
probabilities of all models are bounded away from zero. 
In a similar way, one could construct more complex and intelligent 
search procedures. One might keep any number of models active at a given 
time. The search mobility increases with the number of active models 
because there are more seed points for model enumeration. Short-term 
predictions might be improved by using a weighted average of all active 
models, where the weights are proportional to the models' current poste- 
rior probabilities. If the most probable model is included in the weighted 
average, predictions based on the weighted average have the same asymp- 
totic behavior as predictions based on the most probable model. 
The SR procedure is intended to model an agent restricted in her ability 
to represent and compute her entire mixture distribution. But it is defi- 
cient in one important respect as a plausible model for a bounded agent. 
Each time the agent enumerates a new model, she must compute the 
likelihood of the entire sequence of previously observed ata under the 
new model. This means that the agent must not only remember the entire 
past sequence of data points Xt, but must also remember all past values of 
any auxiliary variables Ylt, YEt . . . .  that might be required to compute any 
of the P,o. Finally, to compute hoo, she must compute and multiply 
together the values P(XsIH~) for all s < t. The feasibility of this is 
doubtful. It may be feasible for the agent o use a heuristic approximation 
of h,oo. Of course, the results of this section apply only when the correct 
likelihoods are used; however, these results may be able to be extended 
under certain assumptions to the case of approximate likelihoods. 
The SR procedure may be more feasible as a model of information 
exchange among agents. Suppose that the set lq indexes a large population 
of different agents. Each agent to has his own model Po. After each trial, 
each agent computes his own model's likelihood h,o t for the data. The SR 
agent begins by selecting one of the agents toot as an advisor. On each 
trial, she interviews an alternate advisor °')at, and replaces her current 
advisor if she believes it is more probable that the interviewee will provide 
correct predictions than that the current advisor will [i.e., she changes 
advisors according to (6)]. Theorem 3 says that such a sequential selection 
process will yield asymptotically correct forecasts if one of the agent's 
models is asymptotically correct and each agent is interviewed infinitely 
often. 
SR possesses the important property that it will eventually track cor- 
rectly any process which one of the models in the search space can track. 
This is true assuming only that each model is visited infinitely often. In 
particular, the probability that the correct model to* is visited on any trial 
can be very small, and can even decrease with increasing t (as long as it 
does not decrease so rapidly that to* is not visited infinitely often). 
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But real forecasters cannot wait until infinity. Of more importance to 
them is the shorter-term performance of SR. This will depend on the 
properties of the model enumeration process /z t. Although suggestions 
were made above for improving search, this paper does no formal analysis 
of short-term performance. For some classes of models there has been 
experience with search procedures that appear to work well in the shorter 
term (e.g., [17]). Short-term forecasts might be improved by using model 
diagnostics to suggest new models to enumerate based on the performance 
of the current model (c.f. [28]). One must be careful to construct he 
search procedure so that each model is visited infinitely often. 
3.3. Relaxing the Memory Requirement 
Usually when entertaining a new theory one does not have available all 
the data which went into the computation of the current theory's likeli- 
hood function. If one moves from the population-of-forecasters interpreta- 
tion to one in which a single forecaster enumerates models sequentially, 
the memory requirement of Section 3.2 may be untenable. This section 
considers relaxation of the memory assumption. 
To do this, a search strategy is defined which can be followed by a 
memory-limited agent. This strategy will be called SRF (for search and 
revise with forgetting). SRF works like SR in that the agent makes 
predictions on the basis of a current model while searching a space of 
alternate models. Again, the current model and the alternate model are 
compared on the basis of relative posterior probabilities, and the more 
probable model is retained. The differences between SRF and SR are: 
• alternate models are retained for an observation period while perfor- 
mance statistics are being collected (unlike SR, in which a new 
alternate model was generated each time period); and 
• posterior probabilities are computed on the basis of data observed 
after the alternate model has been enumerated. 
The agent applying SRF need only remember the information required to 
compare the current model and the alternate model; information eces- 
sary to evaluate other models will be required only when those models are 
enumerated. 
If the agent is permitted to forget data, additional conditions are needed 
to ensure reasonable behavior of SRF predictions under the mixture 
distribution. Specifically, one needs to assume that the nature of the 
process is not changing too rapidly with time: that the models which fit 
well now are likely to be the ones which fitted well in the past. If this 
condition is not met, then SRF will be too likely (relative to SR) to accept 
models which fitted poorly in the past but now fit well. This could cause 
SRF to become trapped in a cycle in which an incorrect model is adopted 
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during those observation periods in which it predicts as well as the correct 
model, and must later be dropped during observation periods in which it 
predicts poorly, z
A particular structure is now assumed for the distribution of the X r 
Suppose that under each Po, the random vectors S t = (Yt,X t) form a 
finite-state Markov chain with constant ransition probabilities. The set f~ 
indexes a finite number of different model structures. For example, the 
different to might specify different independence r lationships among the 
variables comprising (St_l, St). Each Po~ would include both a model 
structure and a procedure (not necessarily Bayesian, but presumably with 
good asymptotic properties under P,o) for estimating model parameters 
given past data. 
The SRF strategy compares models over a trial period of length k. The 
agent begins the nth trial period with a current model toc, and an 
alternate model roan (the initial values toc~ and O.)al may be chosen 
arbitrarily). She observes data over the nth trial period, which consist of 
the variables Snk-k+l . . . . .  Snk. The agent then computes the likelihood 
under each of the two models of the data observed uring the nth trial 
period: 
h,~. = Po,(X.k_k+l[Y.k_k+ l)Po,(X.k-k~ 2IS.k-k+ I,Y.k-k+2) 
× "" × P,,,(XnklS,,k_k+ 1 . . . . .  S,k_lY, ,  k) (11) 
for to = wc,,t%,. At the end of the nth trial period, the agent selects the 
current and alternate models for the n + 1st trial period. The current 
model is replaced by the alternate model if the product of its nth-period 
likelihood and its prior probability is higher than that of the current 
model: 
{ Wcn if a.,c°lh,o,. ~>_ a,o.°lh,oo ~, w~,~ +1 = toa~ otherwise. ° (12) 
The next alternate model OJa,.+ 1 is selected according to a probability 
distribution /.dtolQn), where Qn represents all the information available 
to the agent during the nth trial period: 
Qn = (S.k_k+ l ,S .k_k+2, . . . ,  S~k to¢. wa~). (13) 
2If the environment is changing slowly, the correct model is not in the search space, 1~ 
contains models which predict well in the short term, and the search process is likely to find a 
good short-term predictor when the current one begins to fail, then SRF may perform better 
than SR. Analyzing the nonstationary case would be an interesting extension to the present 
paper. 
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In comparing the models, the agent uses only data collected since the 
alternate model was enumerated. Under this assumption, the random 
sequence Qn is a Markov chain with fixed transition probabilities. If 
tt(tolQn) is positive for all to and none of the P,o assigns zero probabilities, 
then any state can be reached from any other state. Under these condi- 
tions, the chain possesses a stationary distribution (see, e.g., [29]). That is, 
if the process is permitted to evolve for a long period of time, the 
frequency with which it occupies tate q approaches a limiting probability 
%. 
To avoid deterioration of forecasts at the beginning of each forecast 
period, the agent's forecast is based on all data observed since the current 
model was enumerated: 
Pt = e~co( X, ISm~-k + 1 . . . . .  S,_ 1,Y,), (14) 
where tocn was first enumerated as the alternate model on trial m of the 
model selection process, was adopted after the observation period, and has 
been the current model since. The trial period must be sufficiently long to 
provide stable estimates of the parameters of each model in the model 
space. 
The SRF process does not converge to the correct probabilities (except 
in the uninteresting case in which all models are asymptotically correct). 
From any state (including states in which the current model has high 
posterior probability relative to the other models) it is possible to reach 
any other state (including states in which the current model has very low 
posterior probability). There is always a nonzero probability of switching to 
any model, even bad models. 
At equilibrium, transitions out of a state must balance transitions into 
the state. Let C denote the set of states for which the limiting posterior 
probability is greater than zero (these must all be asymptotically correct 
models), and D denote the set of states for which the limiting posterior 
probability is equal to zero (if there are any asymptotically incorrect 
models, D must be nonempty by Lemma 1). Let Pst denote the probability 
of transition from state s to state t. Then the probability of transition from 
C to D must equal the probability of transition from D to C: 
}-'. ~P~, = E 7rtP,s. (15) 
seC seC 
teD teD 
Increasing the length k of the trial period decreases the spread of the 
posterior probabilities about their limiting values. This decreases the 
probabilities Psi of transitions out of states in C and increases the 
probabilities of transitions out of states in D. From (15) it can be seen that 
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the effect of this is to increase the equilibrium probabilities of states in C. 
But increasing the trial period also increases the amount of time the 
system stays with each model, and therefore slows down the time it takes 
to move away from an initial poorly fitting model. This suggests the 
possibility of beginning SRF with a short trial period and gradually 
increasing the trial period as time goes on.  3 Stochastic acceptance, as 
described in Section 3.2, might be used to increase the mobility of the 
search. 
In summary, the SRF model was analyzed on a restricted class of 
problems--those in which the observations could be modeled as a finite- 
state Markov chain with unknown transition probabilities. It was shown 
that SRF with a fixed trial period does not converge to mixture model 
probabilities under the mixture model, but that increasing the length of 
the trial period decreases the probability of states in which the current 
model probabilities are far from the mixture probabilities. Further analysis 
of the properties of SRF is a topic for future research. 
4. DISCUSSION 
This paper has considered the problem of an agent sequentially making 
probabilistic predictions and simultaneously searching for a better model 
for making predictions. The paper defined a search strategy called SR 
which replaces the agent's current model if a more probable one is found. 
Under the assumptions that each model is enumerated infinitely often and 
that posterior probabilities are based on all past data, it can be shown that 
if any of the models in the search space is asymptotically correct, then 
predictions using SR are asymptotically correct. 
If the infinite-memory assumption is relaxed, some sort of stationarity 
assumption is needed to achieve convergence r sults. Without stationarity, 
a system with limited memory cannot distinguish between models that 
have similar behavior within the period the system remembers but which 
performed very differently in the more distant past. It can therefore be 
fooled into accepting bad models if their recent history is good, In Section 
3 it was shown that the search and replace with forgetting (SRF) process 
does not produce asymptotically correct probabilities, but the equilibrium 
probability of the asymptotically correct models can be made as large as 
desired by increasing the system's memory. It is conjectured that a gradual 
increase in memory may result in convergence to asymptotically correct 
3It may be possible to show that a suitably chosen schedule for lengthening the trial period 
implies convergence in probability, but that is a matter for another paper. 
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probabilities, but that convergence with finite memory cannot be achieved 
unless the complexity of the models is limited. 
The foregoing discussion assumed that the mixture model was adequate. 
That is, the agent's larger-world probabilities are the same as in a model in 
which there is an unknown correct model in the agent's earch space, and 
the agent believes that the mixture model probabilities will eventually 
match empirical frequencies arbitrarily closely. It is interesting to consider 
what can be said about the search processes when the agent akes seriously 
the proposition that none of the models is asymptotically correct. 
The behavior of a mixture distribution when none of the models is 
correct depends on the limiting behavior of the model likelihoods under 
the correct distribution. If IIt(Yt,X t) is the actual joint distribution of 
(Yt,Xt), then it may be reasonable to assume that a version of the law of 
large numbers holds, and that under I/, 
1 T 
Ur = -~ ~log  Po,(XtIHt) (16) 
t-1 
approaches a limit as T ~ ~. 
The average log-likelihood U r is a quantity often used to evaluate 
probability forecasts. Suppose a forecaster assesses probabilities over a set 
of events, and when the observation is made receives a score log p, where 
p is the probability assigned to the event that actually occurred. The value 
Ut is the agent's average score under this logarithmic scoring rule. The 
logarithmic scoring rule is an example of a proper scoring rule: that is, 
the expected score is maximized by assigning the correct probability 
distribution. 
Note that if two models have equal prior probabilities, SR selects the 
model for which the past logarithmic score is highest. As T approaches 
infinity, the effect of the prior wears off; in the limit, SR settles on the 
model with the highest limit of the average logarithmic score. Of course, if 
the logarithmic scores of some models do not converge to a limit, SR may 
never converge, but may instead wander indefinitely between models that 
make different predictions. 
If the correct model is in the search space, any proper scoring rule 
(including the logarithmic rule) will be maximized under the correct 
model. When the correct model is not in the search space, different 
models may maximize different proper scoring rules. To cite a trivial 
example, it is possible for the model that maximizes the average quadratic 
score to assign zero probability to events with some chance of occurring. 
Any model which assigns zero probability to an event with a positive 
probability of occurring has a logarithmic score of negative infinity and a 
limiting posterior probability of zero. Therefore, it is possible for SR to 
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assign zero posterior probability to, and therefore never adopt, the model 
that maximizes the average quadratic score. Thus, SR may have unaccept- 
able asymptotic behavior when the agent believes that the correct model 
may not be in the search space, and when models are evaluated according 
to a scoring rule other than the logarithmic rule. 
The results of this paper are interesting not just as specific results for 
the particular SR strategy or its variants, but for the types of condition 
required to prove long-run convergence to the correct probabilities under 
the agent's larger-world model. It is conjectured that the major conditions 
(e.g., that models are visited infinitely often; that stationarity assumptions 
and model complexity bounds are required for convergence if the agent 
has bounded memory) represent fundamental limits on learning. Interest- 
ing directions for extension of this work include analysis of the relationship 
between the model enumeration process and short-term predictions, incor- 
poration of the cost of computing into model evaluation, and analysis of 
problems involving utility and choice among actions. 
APPENDIX: PROOFS OF RESULTS 
The proofs of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 do not depend on finiteness of 
II. 
Proof of Lemma 1 Let h,ot be defined as (7), the likelihood of the 
observed ata under the model indexed by w. Consider the sequence of 
random variables 
Rt(  09,o9* ) = (A - l )  
/~(o* t
defined by ratios of likelihoods of the data under P,o and P,o*, respectively. 
This likelihood ratio satisfies the equation E[ Rt(  o9, o9" )1 n t ] = R t _ l( oJ, o9" ), 
where the expectation is taken under the distribution Po,*- A sequence 
with this property is called a martingale. Because the martingale (A-l) is 
always nonnegative, the martingale convergence theorem applies (cf. [29]). 
Therefore, there exists a limiting random variable R(og, og*) such that 
R~(og,og*) ~ R(og, og*) with probability 1under Po,*. 
The random variable 
Rt(w*) = ~ a,olRt(og,w*) (A-2) 
is also a nonnegative martingale, and therefore also converges to a limiting 
variable R(og*). Note that Rt(o9*) > a~,.1Rt(w*,w*)= a,o.l, so that 
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Rt(to*) is bounded away from zero. The posterior probability of model to 
is given by 
a,olRt( to,to* ) 
(A-3) s ' t  = R,(  to* ) 
This ratio converges to a limit a,o equal to the quotient of the limits of 
numerator and denominator. From (A-l) it is clear that Rt(to,to*) con- 
verges to a nonzero limit, and therefore that so, > 0, only if (4) holds. • 
Proof of Corollary 2 We have 
IP(X, IH,) - Po,,(X, IH,)l ~ ~ oLo,,IP,~(X~II-I,) - Po,,(X, IH,)l. 
to ~ f l  
The quantities [P,o(XtlHt) -Po, , (Xt IHt)[  are bounded above by 1, and 
ao, t converges to zero unless (A-4) holds. But (A-4) implies that 
Ieo,(x, In,)  - e,o,(s,  In,)l --' O. Therefore, each term in the sum converges 
to zero, which implies that the sum converges to zero. • 
Proof of Theorem 3 The proof of Lemma 1 established that s,ot --' % 
with probability 1. Let w 1 be the index of the smallest nonzero limiting 
1 probability: %,~ = min{s,o:to ~ ~ and so, # 0}. Let q = ~so, ,. For each to 
there is an index T,o such that [so, so,[ < q if t > To,. Let T = max{To,}. 
Then for t > T, ls,,,t - so,I < q for all to ~ II. Therefore, if t > T, 
if %,=0 then a,ot<q;  
if so, v~ 0 then aoj t > s~ - q >_ ao~ 1- q = q. 
Thus, once an to for which ao~ > 0 is visited on a trial greater than T, it 
will remain the case that %,, > 0 on all future trials. That is, act will 
remain at to for which the limiting posterior probability is strictly positive. 
These are values for which (4) holds. Hence, (8) holds. The foregoing 
argument is valid for each realization for which the a,,,t all converge, and 
Lemma 1 is established that such realizations occur with probability 1 
under P,o*. • 
Proof of Corollary 4 Suppose the agent believes that the X t actually 
arise from one of the distributions P~,.. By Theorem 3, the agent believes 
that (8) holds, which implies that [P,o(XtIH t) -P,,, .(XtJHt)I ~ 0 with 
probability 1. By Theorem 2, I P (X  t H t) - Po,.(XtlHt)l ~ 0 with probability 
1. Therefore, IP,,,(XtJH t) - P(XtIHt)[ ~ 0 with probability 1. But proba- 
bility 1 convergence implies convergence in distribution, which is (9). But if 
(9) holds for any process distributed according to the mixture distribution 
P, it holds for all such distributions. • 
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